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Exhibit A

Proposed Brief of Economists Supporting Dr. Rysman's "Variety" Model as [Proposed] Amici Curiae

Related to: Motion for Leave To File Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support
of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion To Exclude Merits Opinions of Drr.
Marc Rysman.

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

11
12 **IN RE GOOGLE PLAY STORE**
13 **ANTITRUST LITIGATION**

14 THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

15 *State of Utah et al. v. Google LLC et al.*,
16 Case No. 3:21-cv-05227-JD

17 *In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig.*, Case
18 No. 3:21-md-02981-JD

19 *In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust Litig.*,
20 Case No. 3:20-cv-05761-JD

Case No. 3:21-md-02981-JD

[PROPOSED] BRIEF OF ECONOMISTS
SUPPORTING DR. RYSMAN'S
"VARIETY" MODEL AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF STATES'
AND CONSUMERS' OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE MERITS OPINIONS OF DR.
MARC RYSMAN

Judge: Hon. James Donato

1 I. INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS OF *AMICI*¹

2 Proposed *amici* are three renowned economists: Steven Berry, Ariél Pakes, and Katja Seim.
 3 Throughout their careers, each has demonstrated deep commitment to understanding competition and
 4 to the ongoing project of developing and updating economic tools that push forward the analysis
 5 underpinning effective antitrust enforcement. *Amici*'s commitment is revealed in their scholarship,
 6 teaching, and government service. In particular, *amici* are key contributors to the literature providing
 7 the theoretical foundation for many of the economic tools that power modern antitrust enforcement.
 8 This research, and the research that builds on it, regularly influences rulings and outcomes in antitrust
 9 cases.² Successful antitrust analysis relies on economic tools to reveal how markets function, identify
 10 conduct likely to generate anticompetitive effects, and measure the harms attributable to lost
 11 competition, among other things.

12 Economic models are perhaps the most important of these tools. A model is, as Google
 13 disparagingly asserts, an “abstraction.” Google uses the word “abstraction” pejoratively as if that
 14 characteristic is a sufficient reason for exclusion. This is false. Economists understand that models are
 15 abstractions both by design and by necessity. *By design*, models present abstractions of real-life,
 16 dynamic systems in that they identify and isolate the key mechanisms by which the major elements in
 17 the system affect one another, while ignoring those with less impact on the outcomes being studied.
 18 And *by necessity*, a model provides an abstraction of the counterfactual world because it is not possible
 19 to predict in detail and with certainty outcomes in markets we can never observe.³ The simplicity is
 20 why model can be used to learn how that system would behave under counterfactual conditions.

21 _____
 22 ¹ No party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part and no person contributed money
 23 intended to fund its preparation or submission. *Cf.* Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). Nothing in this brief or
 24 the motion for leave to file it represents the views of the Yale Law School or Yale University, if any,

25 ² Additional information about each economist can be found in an Appendix X, which appears on
 the page after the signature block.

³ To abstract (v.) is “to make a summary or abstract of”; an abstract (n.) in turn, is “something that
 summarizes or concentrates the essential elements of a larger thing.” To abstract (v.) also is to

1 *Amici* have an interest in the motion to exclude Dr. Rysman’s testimony. A ruling crediting
2 Google’s two, core critiques—that the variety model is a mere “abstraction” and that innovation harms
3 aren’t the proper subjects of modeling in any event—could undermine the use of economic models
4 generally and spell the end for models that identify or quantify innovation harms in particular.

5 Google complains that the variety model relies on assumptions that ignore various complexities
6 and conflict with certain market facts. But that critique alone cannot justify exclusion. *All* model-based
7 testimony would then be at risk of exclusion, because *all* models use assumptions that describe reality
8 only imperfectly. Moreover, all antitrust cases require a comparison of the features and outputs of a
9 real, operating market to the features and outputs we predict the market would generate were it
10 operating under counterfactual conditions. This thought experiment requires a model, else courts will
11 have nothing to base their predictions on but hunch, intuition, or even implicit bias.

12 The use of models in antitrust to predict the counterfactual is therefore well established.
13 Moreover, the economic literature has for decades confirmed that the tools and methods economists
14 use to build models for antitrust cases—including assumptions that simplify the complexity of real-life
15 markets by abstracting only their key features—produce reliable results. Excluding economic models
16 because they are “abstractions” would upend all of this.

17 As strong proponents of models and their use in antitrust, we defend Dr. Rysman’s model
18 against Google’s grab bag of grievances, in addition to defending it against the core grievances. We
19 focus on those grievances that are economic in nature at least in part and that relate to economic
20 models of choice, innovation, and variety.

21
22 _____
23 “consider apart from application to or association with a particular instance,” and something may
24 properly be described as abstract (adj.) if it is “disassociated from any specific instance.” *See* Abstract,
25 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abstract>. Together,
these definitions suggest an *abstraction* should be understood as a representation that gives attention
and prominence to a thing’s essential elements while isolating those elements from surrounding noise
and distracting complexity.

1 **II. ARGUMENT**

2 **A. Innovation increases welfare by driving quality and variety improvements;**
 3 **reducing it shrinks welfare, causing economic harm to consumers; innovation**
 4 **harms are therefore a proper subject of modeling.**

5 Google’s motion, taken as a whole, portrays the harms attributable to reduced innovation as
 6 trifling and unworthy of serious attention or modeling. Google is well out of bounds with this position,
 7 however. Economics has long recognized the connection between innovation and welfare, and the
 8 increasing digitization of consumer goods and services will only elevate the importance of innovation-
 9 based competition relative to competition based on price. It therefore is important to develop models
 10 that explain and quantify innovation’s effects on welfare in particular markets.

11 **(1) The connection between innovation and welfare is long established.**

12 For more than half a century, economists have recognized that innovation, in product quality
 13 and variety, drives productivity growth and raises living standards. Robert Solow won a Nobel Prize
 14 for his decades-long contribution to the study of innovation and its importance to productivity,
 15 economic growth, and consumption.⁴ Professor Solow’s empirical research and that of hundreds of
 16 subsequent empirical researchers confirms the tremendous impact of innovation on consumer welfare.⁵

17 Firms innovate to win customers; they do this because customers value quality improvements
 18 and variety. Innovation-based competition takes on special significance in digital markets in which so
 19 many digital products and services are sold for a non-cash price (sometimes erroneously described as
 20 “free”). Innovation-based competition is not new, of course; it predates the rise of modern digital
 21 platforms in familiar products such as broadcast TV and terrestrial radio.

22 ⁴ Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
 23 Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel:1987, [https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1987/summary/)
 24 [sciences/1987/summary/](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1987/summary/)

25 ⁵ Kevin A. Bryan, Heidi L. Williams, Innovation: Market Failures and Public Policies, Editors: Kate
 Ho, Ali Hortaçsu, Alessandro Lizzeri, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 5, Issue
 1, 2021, Pages 281-388, ISSN 1573-448X, ISBN 9780323988872,
<https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesind.2021.11.013>.

1 Given the bedrock economic truth that competition often manifests through innovation and its
 2 consequent improvements in quality and variety, it is not surprising that courts regularly acknowledge
 3 innovation as a dimension of competition.⁶ Consider how innovation spurred by the competition
 4 between rival suppliers has produced new medical treatments, better seeds, more powerful
 5 semiconductor chips, safer cars, and countless other products we enjoy every day. That these
 6 improvements in choice and quality contribute massively to welfare is obvious. It also is obvious, and
 7 unquestioned in the modern literature, that a reduction in innovation reduces welfare. Given the robust
 8 body of evidence of the value of innovation, it is incumbent on enforcers and courts to consider the
 9 impact of conduct in particular cases on innovation. A blind spot for innovation impacts risk subjecting
 10 consumers, and all of society, to significant welfare losses. Economic models that help identify and
 11 quantify innovation harms are therefore vital.

12 **(2) Innovation harms (including reduced quality or variety) are economic harms.**

13 Google argues that the variety model is irrelevant to the proceedings because it measures only
 14 emotional harm that is neither cognizable nor compensable under the Clayton Act. We are not experts
 15 in what the Clayton Act requires as proof of injury and damage. But to the extent Google’s argument
 16 depends in any way on the assertion that lost innovation causes only noneconomic harm, or on the
 17 assertion that the variety model described in Dr. Rysman’s expert report (putting to the side for now
 18 how anyone may have described it in deposition) predicts only emotional harm, we flatly reject it
 19 because both assertions are inarguably wrong.

20 there simply is no dispute among economists that innovation contributes to consumers’ *economic*
 21 welfare and that suppressing it lowers quality and decreases variety, which reduces welfare and
 22 imposes economic harm. We continue to develop methods for measuring and predicting the *magnitude*
 23

24 ⁶ See States’ Opposition to Motion To Exclude Merits Opinions of Dr. Rysman (Dkt. 512) at 11-12 (collecting
 25 cases); *see also id.* at 12 (citing Horizontal Merger Guidelines).

1 of innovation harms. This project is far from simple, though consensus principles informing it all
2 assume or confirm the economic nature of the harms at issue. Economic tools can clearly demonstrate
3 how lessened innovation is an economic harm, just as a higher price is. In a typical price harm, the
4 demand curve stays fixed but the price increases, shrinking consumer surplus. Innovation affects
5 consumer surplus differently, but no less directly. Improved products raise the demand curve because
6 products create more value for users, thereby expanding the size of the area of surplus. Constraints on
7 innovation do the opposite, shifting the demand curve down and shrinking that surplus. The takeaway
8 here is that a higher price or lessened innovation both hurt consumers. It is not the case that price
9 increases shrink surplus whereas lost innovation harms hurt feelings. Rather, each can be shown within
10 the same model because they are both economic losses.

11 Economists measure consumer welfare using a metric called “utility,” a term of art that accounts
12 for all product characteristics a consumer values. “Happiness” is not a term of art in economics, but, by
13 analogy, can help explain utility to non-economists. This is because happiness, like utility, also can be
14 understood as a measure affected by the influence of a broad range of factors that can include financial
15 health, reliability of tools confer various forms of benefits. The variety model predicts the *utility* of the
16 set of apps that would have been released but for Google’s conduct, the loss of which serves as proxy
17 for lost welfare. Under questioning, Dr. Rysman agreed that, because happiness and utility are
18 analogous, one way to understand the variety model is as an attempt to predict lost happiness. In
19 context, it is clear Dr. Rysman agreed that his model predicts happiness in the broad sense, a sense that
20 includes outcomes like financial well-being and the functionality and attributes of physical
21 possessions. Reducing that sort of happiness plainly results in more than just hurt feelings. Second, the
22 model may predict emotional harm, but mainly predicts economic harm, as can be seen by the factors
23 it includes and measures.

24 **B. Economic models strip away complexities to reveal how elements in complex**
25 **systems interact; none is perfect; new markets demand new models.**

1
2 **(1) All models are abstractions that that we seek constantly to improve.**

3 As noted above, a model is designed to be an abstraction. Use of a model is best practice and
4 necessary for an economist to achieve a reliable answer to any question that requires knowing the
5 impact of counterfactual conduct. As the discipline progresses, our models and counterfactuals have
6 gotten better. Models that enabled counterfactual predictions of price were the first to be invented
7 because that setting is somewhat simpler than innovation. Subsequent work has been done on
8 analogous models of entry, innovation, and product variety.⁷ More detailed demand models have been
9 used in many legal proceedings and vertical models have been used extensively to evaluate the impacts
10 of mergers in vertical markets.⁸ Modeling the impact of conduct or market structure on either R&D
11 expenditures or the resulting new products requires incorporating the forward-looking behavior of
12 firms.⁹

13 The economic literature contains long-established and robust ways of modeling the way
14 innovation benefits end consumers. Essentially, when a consumer makes a choice to consume a
15 particular product, he or she is choosing from among options that have different qualities, features,
16 novelty, and prices. If one available choice incorporates a new innovation that consumers like, that
17 product will gain sales and market share. The consumers who choose it are better off, as evidenced by
18 the fact that they moved away from a choice that had previously offered the most utility. Of course,
19 there may be minor features of products that increase consumer utility very little, as well as major ones

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⁷ See, e.g., Katja Seim, et al., *The Welfare Consequences of Mergers with Product Repositioning*, 66
21 *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2018); Katja Seim et al., *Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local
Phone Service*, 38 *RAND Journal of Economics* (2008).

22 ⁸ E.g., Steven C. Solop, *Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement*, 127 *Yale L.J.* 1742 (2018) (arguing
23 improvements in modeling has lent certainty to settings that currently were not amenable to valid
predictions).

24 ⁹ E.g., Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, *Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework
for Empirical Work*, the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1 (2012).

1 that increase consumer welfare significantly. In general, innovation that generates products consumers
2 want to buy naturally increases consumer welfare.

3 **(2) Modern techniques allow for the quantitative estimation of parameters in**
4 **models of innovation**

5 More recently, economists have developed estimation methods for these models that allow
6 researchers to quantify how much consumers benefit from particular innovations and features. An
7 innovation model is guided by the behavior of consumers; when consumers value an innovation, they
8 purchase it instead of a less innovative product. The innovation could be technology or something as
9 simple as a new location near the consumer, or a new combination of existing features that appeals to
10 consumer tastes. By measuring which products are chosen, the econometrician can back out which
11 attributes are valued by consumers, and how different customers value attributes differently.

12 The estimated parameters can be used to quantify outcomes in a counterfactual setting that cannot be
13 measured directly. The first powerful economic models that allowed for counterfactual studies of price
14 tackled demand estimation. The next generation of modeling showed how to handle differentiated
15 products, a common type of competition in the economy.¹⁰

16 These models (often referred to as “BLP” due to the seminal article) are used extensively in
17 merger analysis because they allow the impact of the merger on price to be simulated. Another branch
18 of the literature models consumer benefits from the introduction of innovations and the incentives of
19 firms to enter.¹¹ Estimation followed by scholars such as Ariel Pakes, Matthew Gentzkow, and Joel
20 Waldfogel who studied consumer choice but allowed entry in markets such as newspapers,
21 telecommunication equipment, songs, and apps.¹² This work and others shows that there are a series of

22 ¹⁰ See Berry, Steven, “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” *RAND*
23 *Journal of Economics*, Summer 1994, 23 (2), 242–262.

24 ¹¹ See Goolsbee and Petrin “The Consumer Gains from Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Competition
25 with Cable Television” *Econometrica* 72(2), March 2004, 351-381.

¹² Competition and Ideological Diversity: Historical Evidence from US Newspapers” (with Jesse M.
Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson). *American Economic Review*. 104(10). October 2014.

1 increasingly sophisticated ways of measuring the impacts of increased variety and quality on consumer
2 welfare in particular industries.¹³ In light of the extensive and well-known economic literature that has
3 developed in this area, the variety model is reasonable and reliable.

4 **III. CONCLUSION**

5 We have explained that abstract modeling is an essential tool for an economist and such
6 modeling requires assumptions and factual inputs. Models will never be crafted to include each
7 individual data point. Averages and simplifying assumptions render the empirical problem tractable
8 and plausible. Despite their abstraction, they may be a good approximation of the damage estimate
9 needed. A model’s assumptions can be tested against data for their validity and such analyses
10 presented in court.¹⁴

13 Dated: May 26, 2023

Respectfully submitted,



16 By: _____

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21 _____
22 ¹³ These range from obtaining bounds on the gains to quality and variety, to more sophisticated models which provide
23 direct measures of gains in consumer welfare. For example, a lower bound to the gains from the increasing variety can be
obtained from the value of the time spent by consumers on the products in addition to the purchase price. For an example
see “Internet Rising, Prices Falling: Measuring Inflation in a World of e-Commerce,” (Goolsbee and Peter Klenow), AEA
Papers and Proceedings, May 2018, 108: 488–492.

24 ¹⁴ See the reviews by Doraszelski U, Pakes A. A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO. In: Armstrong M, Porter
R The Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 3, New York: Elsevier ; 2007. pp. Chapter 33 2183-2162 and Dynamic
25 Games in Empirical Industrial Organization, Victor Aguirregabiria, Allan Collard-Wexler and Stephen Ryan, forthcoming
in the Handbook of Industrial Organization (September 2021).

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Appendix A


Steven Berry is the David Swensen Professor of Economics and Jeffrey Talpins Faculty Director of the Tobin Center for Economic Policy at Yale University. He specializes in the empirical analysis of markets in equilibrium and the dynamic analysis of industries, is a winner of the Frisch Medal of the Econometric Society and is an elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Ariél Pakes is the Thomas Professor of Economics at Harvard University. He has developed wide ranging tools and models used by government agencies and others to explain how dynamic systems respond to environmental and input changes and has won the Nemmers Prize in Economics for his "fundamental contributions" to the empirical study of market power, prices, mergers, and productivity.

Katja Seim is the Sharon Oster Professor of Economics and Management at Yale University with joint appointments in the School of Management and the Department of Economics. She studies firms' responses to competition policy and the interplay between market power and the outcomes of government auctions, was chief economist at the Federal Communications Commission, and is co-editor of the American Economic Review.

E-FILING ATTESTATION

I, David C. Dinielli, am the ECF User whose ID and password are being used to file this document. In compliance with Civil Local Rule 5-1(h)(3), I hereby attest that each of the signatories identified above has concurred in this filing.

By:  _____

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