The Third Circuit held today that a dual U.S. and non-U.S. citizen who domiciles overseas fails to satisfy the requirements for "diversity" and "alienage" jurisdiction in federal courts. The defendant-in-question — Charles Lubar, a partner in Morgan, Lewis & Bockius — lives in London, where he holds British citizenship and serves as President of the local Yale Club. But he had utterly nothing to do with the dispute, which seems to relate to Clifton Swiger’s unhappy employment by and unsatisfying litigation with a ML&G client, Allegheny Energy.
The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Third Circuit affirmed. A partnership (like ML&B) doesn’t count for purposes of diversity and alienage jurisdiction; only its partners do. And a dual American-British citizen who resides and plans to stay in a non-U.S. location doesn’t have any "State" citizenship under the grant of diversity jurisdiction. His or her U.S. citizenship, moreover, overwhelms allegiance to a foreign power under the alienage prong. The partner’s status defeated the complete diversity/alienage requirement and required dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 07-1706 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2008).
All of which took Blawgletter back to a case we read in law school — by happenstance the same one at which Mr. Lubar matriculated. The Memorandum Order in United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, Misc. No. 5357 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1971), describes a pro se claim against Beezlebub for causing "misery" from placement of "deliberate obstacles in plaintiff’s path" and for causing "plaintiff’s downfall." United States District Judge Weber, in dismissing the lawsuit, remarked on the question of jurisdiction:
While the official records disclose no case where this defendant has appeared as a defendant there is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff. The defendant in that action was represented by the preemininent advocate of that day, and raised the defense that the plaintiff was a foreign prince with no standing to sue in an American Court. This defense was overcome by overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Whether this would raise an estoppel in the present case we are unable to determine at this time.
