
After suing to block a big merger the Department of Justice had waved through, a dozen state attorneys-general got a tongue-lashing from the DOJ’s Associate Attorney General.
The AAG chastised his state colleagues for letting the “whims of local constituencies” lead them to oppose that which the DOJ’s Antitrust Division approved.
More broadly, he argued, state AGs ought to focus on deals that “implicate uniquely local interests” and should defer to federal enforcers “when the federal government makes the determination that a merger is in the public interest of the entire nation”. He reminded them that “the Supremacy Clause prioritizes the federal government’s policy choice”. He also defended “the involvement of political appointees in antitrust matters”, urging that the idea of not involving them “is blatantly unconstitutional”.
Whatever else one can say about the AAG’s speech, it aimed to give federal antitrust enforcers a sort of monopoly over actions to halt (or undo) blockbuster mergers like the Warner Bros.-Paramount deal. If—in other words—“political appointees” in the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission decide, as a matter of “policy choice”, not to file a lawsuit over a “national merger” or, having filed one, to settle it cheap, state AGs who disagree should nonetheless follow the feds’ lead.
While a federal monopoly on the handling of the most consequential transactions in the U.S. economy might make no difference in a pro-enforcement environment, it would almost certainly result in fewer merger challenges and more lenient settlement terms in a pro-merger environment.
Like the one the AAG now presides over.

