The Supreme Court of Texas circa 1991.


For the last 32 years, Republicans have held all 9 places on the Supreme Court of Texas, but in January 2027, four Democrats will reduce the majority to 5-4. The new Fifteenth Court of Appeals—which has statewide jurisdiction and hears all challenges to rulings by the new (since 2024) Texas Business Court—will switch from 3-0 Republican to 3-0 the other way. And Democrats also gained spots on most of the 14 other Texas Courts of Appeals, which oversee trial courts in both civil and criminal matters.

An item by Texas Lawbook editor Mark Curriden in The Dallas Morning News on Nov. 12, 2026, presented comments on how the results of the Nov. 3 elections may affect the “civil justice system and business courts.”

The article reminded me of a study I’d done almost 20 years ago about a shift that had gone the other way. The first Republican Justice since Reconstruction had joined the previously all-Democrat Supreme Court of Texas in 1978, and the last Democrat Justice had left it in 1998.

A law review had recently published an article about the “influence” of all 50 states’ highest courts between 1940 and 2005–with influence as a proxy for the quality of the courts’ decisions—and I wanted to see how the replacement of Democrats with Republicans had affected the standing of the Texas judiciary among the judiciaries of its sister states. The results surprised me.

As I wrote in the June 2008 issue of Barnett’s Notes on Commercial Litigation:

The Supreme Court of Texas  (official site here) wielded by far the most influence during the six years when a balance of Democratic and Republican justices sat on it.

From 1940 until 2005, the Court issued 16 opinions that attracted the full agreement of a non-Texas high court on a point of law at least three times.  The relevant decisions line up thus:

1940 — 1
1970 — 1
1984 — 2
1985 — 1
1993 — 1
1994 — 3
1995 — 3
1996 — 1
1997 — 1
1998 — 1
2001 — 1

As you can see, during the six years from 1993 through 1998, the justices rendered 10 of the 16 decisions that won three “followeds” in the 65 years between 1940 and 2005.  That comes to 62.5 percent in less than 10 percent of the survey period.

Dems/Repubs.  What made one six-year period so remarkable?  Let’s add the number of Democrats/Republicans on the Court in each of those years:

1940 — 1   9/0
1970 — 1   9/0
1984 — 2   9/0
1985 — 1   9/0
1993 — 1   5/4
1994 — 3   5/4
1995 — 3   4/5
1996 — 1   3/6
1997 — 1   3/6
1998 — 1   3/6
2001 — 1   0/9

Hmmm.  In every one of the years from 1993 through 1998, the Court’s composition included a substantial number of justices from each of the major political parties.  And the Court’s two most prolific years, 1994 and 1995, happened just at the time of greatest uncertainty about which party would hold a majority.

I hope the new 5-4 Republican-Democrat balance on the Court has a like effect.

Standard Oil Octopus: Past as Prologue

After suing to block a big merger the Department of Justice had waved through, a dozen state attorneys-general got a tongue-lashing from the DOJ’s Associate Attorney General.

The AAG chastised his state colleagues for letting the “whims of local constituencies” lead them to oppose that which the DOJ’s Antitrust Division approved.

More broadly, he argued, state AGs ought to focus on deals that “implicate uniquely local interests” and should defer to federal enforcers “when the federal government makes the determination that a merger is in the public interest of the entire nation”. He reminded them that “the Supremacy Clause prioritizes the federal government’s policy choice”. He also defended “the involvement of political appointees in antitrust matters”, urging that the idea of not involving them “is blatantly unconstitutional”.

The AAG’s vision of “Antitrust Federalism” would compel state enforcers who assess blockbuster mergers like the Warner Bros.-Paramount deal as likely to harm competition to defer to their federal counterparts any time they disagree. If—in other words—“political appointees” in the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission decide, as a matter of “policy choice”, not to file a lawsuit over a “national merger” or, having filed one, to settle it cheap, dissenting state AGs must do as the feds do.

While a federal monopoly on the handling of the most consequential transactions in the U.S. economy might make no difference in a pro-enforcement environment, it would squelch merger challenges and produce more lenient settlement terms in a pro-merger environment.

Like the one the AAG now presides over.

The post below comes from the June 2008 issue of Barnett’s Notes on Commercial Litigation.

Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936). 

Kipling‘s Just So Stories (1902) include the marvelous one about “The Elephant’s Child”. It tells how the elephant got its trunk. 

In what manner did he obtain it. Kipling tells us that, because of Elephant Child’s “‘satiable curiosity”, he wanted to know what Crocodile eats for dinner. Questing for and then finding the object of his interest, he believes Crocodile’s promise to whisper the answer and leans close to hear. 

But Crocodile means to devour him and so clamps toothy jaws on Elephant Child’s diminutive proboscis. Elephant Child tries to pull away, and soon his friend the Bi-Coloured-Python-Rock-Snake coils around his back legs and commences a-pulling too. The double-teaming works, separating Elephant Child from hungry Crocodile, but not before stretching the pachydermous pug to five feet and more.

If we stop here, we would think that Kipling intended a cautionary tale about nosiness. But the author of The Jungle Book, If–, and Kim meant no such thing. His tale instead goes on to demonstrate how useful the accidental product of ‘satiable curiosity became to Elephant Child and his posterity.

“That may all seem well and good to you, Mr. Editor,” we hear you say, “but what does that have to do with the judiciary and its acquisition of inefficiency. Please, good sir, do get to the point. And do it efficiently, mind!”

We shall endeavor to start doing so now. 

In 1905 — his “miracle year” — a Kipling contemporary, physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955), wrote four path-breaking papers. One of them revealed his special theory of relativity . In it, he disclosed that electromagnetic waves, including light, always travel at a constant speed — about 186,000 miles per second — but that our observation of them depends on our movement relative to their source.

Got that?

Your Editor confesses a sensation of doubt. Big time. 

But I feel more confident that our current subject — the efficiency vel nonof federal courts — depends ever so much on the judiciary’s perception of case velocity relative to some reference point. Huh.

Consider that federal judges hold Vast Power. They display a great deal of Independence. And, with few exceptions, they enjoy Near Invisibility outside the courtroom.

All of which leaves Their Honors with tremendous discretionary influence over their dockets. They can move the cases or not move them, push them fast or slow them down, work them hard or hardly at all.

Your Editor hypothesizes that how quickly judges choose to dispatch their dockets depends on whether they look at cases as moving towards trial too fast, too slow, or at just the right speed. 

Next time, I’ll attempt an approximation of which view predominates in 2008 — and, more important perhaps, why.

Standard Oil Octopus

Tech adept David Streitfeld explores the upside of cutting Google into pieces today in The New York Times. He cites talk on Wall Street that Google might reap big rewards if it pre-empted a breakup decree by choosing to “spin off huge chunks of itself into independent entities.”

The breakup of Standard Oil, after all, made John D. Rockefeller the richest man ever.

Streitfeld does note a few likely losers:

“The breakup of Google would only hurt people who would otherwise benefit from unlawful market power,” said Barry Barnett, an antitrust lawyer at Susman Godfrey. “These might include Google executives, whose compensation could fall; start-ups, which could get lower buyout offers from Google or none at all; and rivals like Apple, which could see chances to share revenue vanish.” Google currently pays Apple $20 billion annually to be the default search engine on the Safari browser.

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